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D
ocumentation, analysis, and 
prevention of the harmful 
effects of armed conflict on 
populations are established public 
health priorities [1–5]. Although 
public health research on war is 
increasingly framed in human rights 
terms [6–13], general public health 
methods are typically applied without 
direct links to laws of war. Laws of war 
are international humanitarian laws 
and customary standards regarding the 
treatment of civilians and combatants, 
mainly described in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols I and II regarding 
international and civil conflicts [14]. 
With notable exceptions [11,15–17], 
absolute numbers are usually reported 
(e.g., number of persons killed), 
without systematic description of the 
proportional effects of armed conflict, 
thereby limiting the utility of findings 
and scope of interpretation. 
In this paper, we introduce the 
“Dirty War Index” (DWI): a data-driven 
public health tool based on laws of war 
that systematically identifies rates of 
particularly undesirable or prohibited, 
i.e., “dirty,” war outcomes inflicted on 
populations during armed conflict 
(e.g., civilian death, child injury, or 
torture). DWIs are explicitly linked 
to international humanitarian law to 
make public health outcomes directly 
relevant to prevention, monitoring, 
and humanitarian intervention for 
the moderation of war’s effects. After 
choosing the particular outcome to be 
measured, a DWI is calculated as: 
Number of “dirty,” i.e., undesirable 
DWI =
or prohibited cases
× 100
Total number of cases
For example: In Table 1, we measure 
the DWI ratio of “Number of civilians 
killed/Total number of civilians and 
opponent combatants killed” using a 
casualty dataset for Colombia’s civil 
conflict [18]. Table 2 links this DWI 
to relevant laws of war. DWI values 
of 99 for illegal paramilitaries, 46 for 
guerrillas, and 45 for government 
forces show that paramilitaries are 
“dirtiest” in terms of proportion of 
civilians constituting their victims 
of unopposed attacks (chi-square = 
5,010, degree of freedom [df] = 2, p
< 0.001). 99% of paramilitary victims 
were civilians and only 1% were military 
opponents. This finding, combined 
with the paramilitaries’ methods 
(execution by close-range gunfire 
in massacres), suggests intentional 
targeting of civilians that requires 
recognition in Colombia’s paramilitary 
demobilization, disarmament, and 
reintegration process [19]. 
As ratios, DWIs complement 
absolute numbers and lend themselves 
to comparisons over time, between 
wars, between weapons, and between 
warring combatant groups to identify 
better versus worse performers. 
Noncombatant wounded-to-killed 
ratios can provide evidence of war 
crimes [16]. Proportional “atrocity 
statistics” [20] from a Darfur survey 
substantiated US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell’s declaration of genocide 
and the referral of Darfur’s situation 
to the International Criminal Court 
[20,21]. By facilitating clear, systematic 
comparisons, DWIs can help analyze 
and expose how combatants engage 
in war and affect populations, thereby 
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Summary Points
sÈ 7ARÈAÈMAJORÈPUBLICÈHEALTHÈPROBLEMÈ
is a situation where the interests of 
public health, human rights, and 
humanitarian law intersect.
sÈ 4HEÈ$7)ÈISÈAÈDATA
DRIVENÈPUBLICÈHEALTHÈ
tool that identifies rates of particularly 
undesirable or prohibited, i.e., “dirty,” 
outcomes inflicted on populations 
during war (e.g., civilian death, child 
injury, or torture).
sÈ !È$7)ÈISÈCALCULATEDÈASÈ.UMBERÈOFÈ
“dirty,” i.e., undesirable or prohibited 
cases/Total number of cases) × 100.
sÈ $7)SÈAREÈDESIGNEDÈFORÈDIRECTÈEASYÈ
translation of war’s public health 
outcomes into the human rights, 
policy, and interdisciplinary work 
needed to address war’s practice.
sÈ $7)SÈSUPPORTÈMONITORINGÈDETERRENCEÈ
and humanitarian intervention 
by explicit links to international 
humanitarian laws and by exposing 
rates of unacceptable combat 
outcomes (DWI values) from different 
weapons or combatant groups.
The Policy Forum allows health policy makers around 
the world to discuss challenges and opportunities for 
improving health care in their societies.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1659 December 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 12  |  e243
increasing the accountability of military 
and political leaders. This paper 
describes the theoretical basis and 
practical applications of the DWI, with 
brief examples from armed conflicts. 
More detailed DWI analyses of specific 
conflicts are planned for future papers.
Calculating and Using DWIs
A DWI can be easily used 
and understood, facilitating 
interdisciplinary communication 
and research on war’s effects. DWIs 
can measure rates of undesirable 
outcomes from accepted methods 
(e.g., civilian casualties from aerial 
bombing of military targets). They can 
also measure rates of using prohibited, 
illegitimate methods (e.g., torture), 
and rates of applying illegitimate 
methods to especially vulnerable 
populations (e.g., torturing children) 
to describe rates of exceptional 
atrocity. However, the mere application 
of DWI analysis to a combatant group 
does not indicate that it is “dirty”: a 
DWI ratio simply identifies how often, 
if at all, the group is linked with the 
particular undesirable outcome being 
measured, facilitating comparisons. 
To illustrate, we draw on data from 
B’Tselem (http://www.btselem.
org/english/statistics/Index.asp), a 
nongovernmental organization that 
monitors casualties from the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. We apply a “female 
mortality DWI” (Number of females 
killed/Total number killed) to conflict-
related killings from September 29, 
2000 to April 30, 2007: Israeli security 
forces killed 213 females among 4,057 
Palestinians (DWI = 5). Palestinians 
killed 283 females among 705 Israeli 
civilians (DWI = 40). Palestinians killed 
10 females among 317 Palestinians 
(DWI = 3). Comparison of actors’ 
DWIs shows significantly higher 
discrimination of female from male 
targets by Israeli security forces and 
by Palestinian actors when targeting 
Palestinians, and lower discrimination 
of female from male targets when 
Palestinian actors target Israeli civilians 
(chi-square = 833, df = 2, p < 0.001).
The best possible DWI value is 0, 
indicating that the objectionable 
outcome is identified in no measured 
cases. The worst possible DWI value is 
100, indicating that the objectionable 
outcome is identified in 100% of 
measured cases. Any rate above 0 
for prohibited actions or war crimes 
is unacceptable, and eliminating 
violations is imperative. DWIs for 
undesirable outcomes are less 
straightforward. The highly undesirable 
outcome of civilian harm is not 
prohibited by laws of war if combatants 
do everything feasible to distinguish 
between civilians and military targets 
(the principle of distinction), if they 
attempt to minimize incidental harm 
to civilians, and if they intend to 
avoid harming civilians in excess of 
anticipated military goals (the principle 
of proportionality) [1,22,23]. Civilian 
harm is also balanced against the 
“military necessity” of objectives [24]. 
Though what is feasible, proportional, 
or necessary is highly subjective 
[22–24], clearly the lowest possible 
rates should be sought for undesirable 
outcomes such as “incidental” civilian 
death. High DWI values for undesirable 
outcomes indicate extreme destruction, 
signal the need for close scrutiny, and 
may suggest war crimes. 
Tables 2 and 3 list specific DWIs, 
their pertinent laws of war, and 
example calculations. Table 2 lists 
DWIs for undesirable or prohibited 
aggression in armed conflict. DWIs 
can be analyzed by demographic 
subgroup for indiscriminate warfare, 
disproportionate effects of targeting, 
or particular vulnerability to weapons. 
For example, with “casualties” defined 
as injuries or deaths, a “child casualty 
DWI” (Number of child casualties/
Total number of casualties) applied 
to weapons-casualty data from 
Chechnya [25] gives the following 
child casualty ratios for different 
explosive devices: antitank landmines 
(34/223, DWI = 15), antipersonnel 
landmines (223/1,004, DWI = 22), 
booby traps (65/214, DWI = 30), and 
other unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
(255/892, DWI = 29). DWIs indicate 
that in Chechnya, UXO and booby 
traps are more dangerous to children 
than landmines and significantly 
“dirtier” in this respect (chi-square = 
25.0, df = 3, p < 0.001).
Table 3 lists DWIs for unacceptable 
endangerment in armed conflict 
[14,23,24]. To illustrate, we apply 
the last DWI listed, “Destroying 
infrastructure essential for civilian 
survival (food, water, hospitals),” to 
Table 1. Dirty War Index for Attacks by Actors in the Colombian Civil Conflict, 1988–2005: Civilian Versus Opponent Combatant 
Mortality
DWI Illegal Paramilitaries Guerrillas Government Forces
No. civilians killed  6,944 2,498 539
No. combatant opponents killed 41 2,946 659
Civilian versus opponent combatant mortality 
DWI calculation: 
No. civilians killed/Total no. of civilians and 
opponent combatants killed, times 100
6,944/6,985 = 0.99 × 100 = 99 2,498/5,444 = 0.46 × 100 = 46 539/1,198 = 0.45 × 100 = 45
DWI value (range 0 to 100) 99 46 45
DWI interpretation Paramilitaries rank highest in killing the 
greatest absolute number of civilians. Their 
DWI value of 99 ranks “dirtiest,” approaching 
the “dirtiest” theoretically possible (100). 
Civilians comprised 99% of victims killed and 
legitimate targets only 1%. The high number 
and high DWI suggest systematic civilian 
targeting.
Guerrillas rank 2nd in killing absolute 
numbers of civilians. Their DWI of 
46 shows that civilians comprised 
46% of victims killed in their attacks, 
a proportion that needs to be 
substantially lowered.
Government forces rank lowest in 
killing absolute numbers of civilians. 
However, as with the guerrillas, their 
DWI of 45 indicates that they need to 
lower substantially the proportion of 
civilians killed in their attacks.
This table includes deaths from one-sided, unopposed attacks by a combatant group, excluding deaths from two-sided clashes in which responsibility for death cannot be reliably 
assigned. Data source: CERAC’s Colombia conflict database (http://www.cerac.org.co/home_english.htm) [18].
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Table 2. DWIs Suggested for Measuring Rates of Undesirable or Prohibited Outcomes from Aggression in Armed Conflict
DWI Pertinent Laws of War [14] Example DWI Calculations
(Numerator/Denominator) × 100
Mortality to civilians versus combatants Fourth Geneva Convention and APs I & II prohibit direct targeting of 
civilians.
No. civilians killed/Total no. civilians and 
combatants killed
AP I prohibits indiscriminate weapon use, indiscriminate weapons, and 
incidental civilian casualties disproportionate to the advantage gained 
in attacking a military target [22].
Injuries to civilians versus combatants As above No. civilians injured/Total no. civilians and 
combatants injured [15]
Lethality to civilians As above No. civilians killed by weapon(s)/Total no. 
civilians killed or injured by weapon(s) 
[15,17,18]
Torture of civilians or combatants Prohibited by Fourth Geneva Convention (re: civilians), APs I & II. No. captured combatants tortured/Total 
no. captured combatants  Prohibited by Third Geneva Convention (re: prisoners of war).
Rape of civilians or combatants As above No. raped by combatant group/Total 
no. having face-to-face contact with 
combatant group [32]
Sexual humiliation or indecent assault of civilians or 
combatants
As above No. captured males sexually assaulted/
Total no. captured males
Mutilation of civilians or combatants As above No. mutilated by combatant group/Total 
no. having face-to-face contact with 
combatant group
Kidnapping or hostage-taking As above No. kidnapped/Total relevant population
Disappearances As above No. households with disappeared 
member/Total no. households
Summary execution of captured prisoners Third & Fourth Geneva Conventions and APs I & II prohibit targeting 
civilians and prisoners of war for harm and require fair trials before 
penalties.
No. captured combatants executed/Total 
no. captured combatants 
Terrorist attacks Prohibited by Fourth Geneva Convention, APs I & II. No. terrorist attacks/Total no. attacks
Assassination of civilian leaders (e.g., union leaders, 
mayors, teachers, religious leaders)
As above No. teachers killed/Total no. teachers
Attacks on medical and religious personnel and on 
medical units
Prohibited by the four Geneva Conventions, APs I & II. No. attacked medical workers/Total no. 
medical workers
Use of particularly undesirable (e.g., indiscriminate) 
weapons or prohibited weapons
AP I prohibits weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering [48].
No. child deaths from a weapon type/ sÈ
Total no. deaths from the weapon type; 
or
No. casualties from a prohibited  sÈ
weapon/Total no. casualties
Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons prohibits 
weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate 
effects.
Protocol I to the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits 
weapons with fragments undetectable by X-rays.
Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits or 
restricts mines and booby-traps.
Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits or 
restricts incendiary weapons.
1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Convention prohibit toxic gas and 
chemical and biological weapons. 
1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction [5]. 
2008 Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits and restricts the 
use of cluster munitions.
Suicide bombers disguised as civilians AP I prohibits feigning civilian status. No. casualties by disguised suicide 
bombs/Total no. casualties AP I requires combatants to distinguish themselves during military 
operations by uniforms, marks, or carrying arms openly [22].
Child mortality or injury Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and APs I & II grant general 
civilian protection and special protection to children [49].
No. child casualties/Total no. casualties
Children may be more vulnerable to some weapons.
High rates of direct child mortality suggest indiscriminate warfare or 
targeting; both prohibited.
Female civilian mortality or injury Fourth Geneva Convention and APs I & II grant general civilian 
protection and special protection to women.
No. women civilians killed/Total no. all 
adults killed
High rates of direct mortality to women civilians suggest indiscriminate 
warfare or targeting; both prohibited.
Elderly civilian mortality or injury Elderly civilians may be vulnerable. No. elderly civilians killed/Total no. all 
civilians killed [50] High rates of direct elderly civilian mortality suggest indiscriminate 
warfare or targeting; both prohibited.
Violence to noncombatant indigenous groups Can be a targeted or vulnerable group in conflict. No. indigenous group member casualties/
Total indigenous population
AP, Additional Protocol.
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survey data from eastern Burma where 
the Burmese military junta is in conflict 
with ethnic minority groups. The 
Burmese military regime destroyed or 
stole food from 472 of 1,813 surveyed 
households [11]. The Burmese 
military’s DWI of 26 indicates a 26% 
rate of committing the humanitarian 
violation of destroying civilian food 
sources, associated in the study with 
significantly greater odds of household 
landmine injury (perhaps due to 
foraging for food), child malnutrition, 
and death [11]. 
In Table 4 we analyze the Northern 
Ireland conflict for two complementary 
DWIs: aggressive acts (killing civilians) 
and endangerment to civilians (by not 
wearing uniforms). Combatants who 
blur distinctions between themselves 
and civilians transfer their risk onto 
civilians [23,24]. Endangerment of 
noncombatants can be a byproduct 
of a method, as when guerrilla forces 
hide “among the people,” taking the 
battlefield to civilians [23,24,26]. 
Endangerment can also be a direct 
goal. As described by Viet Cong leaders 
[27] and American soldiers [23] in the 
Vietnam War, Viet Cong forces trained 
children to throw grenades at South 
Vietnamese and American soldiers, 
partly to provoke opponents to shoot 
children and bring shame to themselves 
and their force. Child soldiers are 
more often killed or injured than adult 
soldiers, being deployed at the front 
line, to lay or clear mines, or as suicide 
bombers because they provoke less 
suspicion [3,28,29]. To illustrate the 
issue of variable access to valid data 
for DWI applications, precise data for 
calculating child solider DWIs (Table 
3) may be difficult to obtain for some 
conflicts. However, DWIs for using 
child soldier suicide bombers (Tables 
2 and 3) could be highly accurate due 
to extensive media coverage of suicide 
attacks.
DWI analysis can use any data source 
(media reports, epidemiological 
surveys, coroners’ reports) as long as 
the data are adequately valid, accurate, 
and comprehensive. DWI analysis can 
be applied to event-based data or to 
aggregated data covering, for example, 
a year, a phase, or a whole conflict. 
Analysis of all DWIs supported by good 
data provides fuller description of a 
conflict and combatant behavior. A 
qualitative understanding of a conflict’s 
nature and context is necessary for DWI 
application and interpretation. When 
possible, analysis should recognize 
when combatants avoid inflicting dirty 
outcomes, i.e., “clean” combat. DWIs 
suggest valuable data for prospective 
inclusion in conflict monitoring. 
Considerations
When DWIs are used to compare 
combatant groups or methods, it 
should not be assumed that those 
with the highest values are simply the 
dirtiest. Nor should it be assumed 
that lower DWI values “don’t count.” 
A group may have a low DWI for 
recorded civilian mortality, but high 
Table 3. DWIs Suggested for Measuring Rates of Unacceptable Endangerment in Armed Conflict
DWI Pertinent Laws of War [14] Example DWI Calculations
(Numerator/Denominator) × 100
Use of child soldiers  APs I & II, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, prohibit recruiting or deploying in hostilities 
children under 15.
No. child combatants/Total no. child and adult combatants
1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child prohibits recruiting or deploying in hostilities 
children under 18.
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
makes it a war crime to enlist or deploy in hostilities 
children under 15.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child prohibits compulsory recruitment of children 
under 18 [49].
Use of human shields Prohibited by AP I [22,23].  No. events using human shields/Total no. events
Initiating weapons fire from among civilians AP I prohibits using human shields and requires 
combatants to protect civilians from dangers of military 
operations to the maximum extent feasible [22,23,26].
No. events where combatant group attacks from among 
civilians/Total no. attacks
Locating headquarters or weapons storage among 
civilians
AP I requires combatants to avoid locating military 
objectives within or near densely populated areas to the 
maximum extent feasible [22,23,26].
No. military sites located among civilians/Total no.  sÈ
military sites; or 
No. households near military sites/Total no. households sÈ
Combatants taking civilian appearance during 
military operations (not wearing uniforms)
AP I prohibits feigning civilian status [22,23,26]. No. combat events where combatants do not wear uniforms 
or distinguishing marks/Total no. combat events 
Combatants disguised as humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, or medical workers
AP I prohibits feigning noncombatant status [22,23]. No. of events of disguise/Total no. events
Leaving landmines or UXO Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
on Explosive Remnants of War requires removing 
explosive remnants to reduce civilian risk [5].
Meters-squared of land with UXO/Total meters-squared  sÈ
of land; or 
No. households with landmine injury/Total no.  sÈ
households [11] 1997 Ottawa Convention prohibits anti-personnel mines 
and calls for their destruction.
2008 Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions requires 
clearance and destruction of cluster munitions.
Destroying infrastructure essential for civilian 
survival (e.g., food, water sources, hospitals)
Prohibited by Fourth Geneva Convention, APs I & II. No. households with destroyed food source/total no. 
households [11]
AP, Additional Protocol.
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DWIs for assassinating civilian leaders 
and disappearances. Another group 
may have low DWIs generally, and a 
very low DWI for torturing prisoners, 
but torture breaches the precepts 
of humanity utterly so that to have a 
measurable rate at all is deplorable.
DWIs reflect, in part, local 
conditions. For example, the lethality 
of civilian injuries reflects local 
treatment technology and access. 
It may therefore seem incorrect to 
compare DWIs for civilian lethality 
when health services differ. Similarly, 
it may seem unfair to compare child 
mortality DWIs between a conflict 
where children comprise a large 
proportion of the population and 
so are more likely to be killed and 
a conflict where children are few. 
However, researchers should not adjust 
for such factors when comparing DWIs 
across settings. This is because actors 
in armed conflict know, or are morally 
obliged to know, local resources and 
demographics and their implications 
for civilian harm. Combatants are 
obliged to take proportionately more 
care not to kill children when waging 
war in a child-dense population. 
Responsibility for dirty outcomes is not 
ameliorated by local conditions. 
As for any conflict analysis [2,3,30], 
DWI selection, application, and 
interpretation must recognize the 
potential, varied biases of data sources 
and of particular DWIs. Conflicts are 
highly politicized, and combatants, 
supporters, and detractors have always 
tried to manipulate reports of war 
outcomes. Combatants may attempt 
to construct more favorable DWIs 
not only by decreasing dirty combat, 
but by concealing dirty outcomes, 
or by misrepresenting or provoking 
opponents’ dirty outcomes. For 
example, a group might attempt to 
raise an opponent’s child mortality 
DWI by using child soldiers or children 
as human shields. 
Some DWI outcomes, such as 
injuries, may tend to be under-reported 
[16]. War-associated rape may be 
difficult to measure due to stigma and 
under-reporting, though substantial 
reports exist [21,24,31,32]. Although 
bias can affect DWI values, as ratios 
DWIs are relatively less affected by 
under- or over-counting than absolute 
numbers. For example, if a population 
generally under-reports war-related 
rape by 40%, this does not bias 
comparing rates between different 
combatant groups. 
DWIs, complemented by absolute 
numbers, can suggest strategic aspects 
of actors’ methods. For example, 
systematic civilian targeting is suggested 
by combined findings of: many events 
killing or injuring civilians; high ratios 
of civilian versus combatant mortality; 
frequent use of methods causing 
high civilian casualties; frequent use 
of methods causing high civilian 
lethality; and high rates of civilian 
harm from methods that are inherently 
“targeted” (handguns, machetes). Such 
proportional and numerical findings 
on civilian casualties have been used 
as evidence in International Criminal 
Court trials to establish systematic 
patterns indicating war crimes [33].
DWIs Measure Outcomes, Not 
Justifications or Intentions 
DWIs focus on whether the practice 
of war is just (jus in bello) and ignore 
whether the reason for war is just (jus
ad bellum), separating two logically 
distinct moral issues in war [23]. We 
focus on practical outcomes because 
justifications for war are contested, are 
used to legitimize dirty combat, and 
can bias examination of war’s impact 
[24,27,34–36]. Combatants and their 
supporters may believe or describe 
methods as just, whether the method 
is suicide bombing [24,37,38] or the 
World War II targeting of civilians by 
Germany and by the Allies with carpet 
bombing, fire-bombing, and atomic 
bombs directed at cities [23,24,26,27]. 
Although intentions affect combat 
outcomes, such as civilian mortality 
rates [16,27,34,35], we separate 
DWIs from intentionality for the 
following reasons. Intentions are 
contested, obscured, and distorted 
Table 4. The Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969–2001: Complementary DWI Analyses for Unacceptable Aggression and Endangerment 
by Actors 
DWI British Security Forces Irish Republican Paramilitaries Loyalist Paramilitaries
No. civilians + civilian political activists 
killed [51]
190 738 873
Total no. persons killed [51] 362 2,056 1,020
Civilian mortality DWI calculation 190/362 = 0.52 × 100 = 52 738/2,056 = 0.36 × 100 = 36 873/1,020 = 0.86 × 100 = 86
Civilian mortality DWI valuea 52 36 86
Combatants not wearing uniforms or 
distinguishing marks in attacks
Extremely low rate; British forces 
routinely wear uniforms in attacks.
Extremely high rate; Republican paramilitaries 
routinely dress as civilians in attacks.
Very high rate; Loyalist paramilitaries 
frequently dress as civilians during attacks.
Attacks without uniform DWI value Approaches 0 Approaches 100 Approaches 100
Interpretation British forces rank second dirtiest in 
terms of civilians constituting half their 
victims (DWI = 52), yet killed the lowest 
number of civilians (n = 190). British 
forces have a low, i.e., “clean” DWI 
value for attacks without uniform.
Republican paramilitaries have a high “attacks 
without uniform DWI” approaching 100. 
They thereby probably increase British forces’ 
civilian mortality DWI by decreasing distinction 
between civilians and Republican combatants. 
Republican paramilitaries killed a high number 
of civilians (n = 738), but relative to their high 
number of total victims were least dirty in 
their civilian mortality ratio (DWI = 36). That 
their military opponents (British forces) wear 
uniforms increases their ability to distinguish 
civilians from combatants and to achieve a 
lower civilian mortality DWI.
Loyalist paramilitaries are dirtiest in terms 
of the civilian mortality DWI, with civilians 
constituting 86% of victims (DWI = 86). 
Loyalists also killed the highest absolute 
number of civilians (n = 873).
aChi-square = 675, df = 2, p < 0.001.
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[3,35]. Dirty outcomes can result from 
malicious intent, beneficent intent, 
or recklessness (lack of intent to take 
due care). Frequently, combatant 
violence that appears wanton, sadistic, 
or vengeful (e.g., rape, mutilation) 
is mobilized by political actors for 
hidden strategic aims [24,27,35,39,40]. 
Combatants’ intended effects may be 
disrupted by targets or adversaries [41]. 
Individual combatant behavior reflects 
overriding goals and sociocultural 
aspects of larger groups [34,35,38]. 
Accommodating intentions or 
justifications in DWIs would imply 
that good intentions or a “just war” 
attenuate responsibility for bad 
outcomes; an implication that is 
morally and legally refuted [36]. DWIs 
therefore only recognize the crucial 
matter of outcomes: the killing, injury, 
or abuse of individuals and populations 
who should be protected from war. 
Potential Deterrent Effect of the 
Dirty War Index
We choose the term “Dirty War Index” 
for three reasons. First, it unites 
moral, humanitarian, and scientific 
values inherent to most armed 
conflict research. Second, it avoids 
euphemisms that sanitize descriptions 
of war-induced public harm 
[12,13,27,42]. Third, emotional and 
cultural implications of “dirty” versus 
“clean” may heighten the sensitivity 
of combatant groups to the index, 
increasing its potential deterrent effect. 
No nation or combatant group wants 
to be considered “dirty” or described as 
dirtier than others. 
Increased accountability can 
have a deterrent effect in armed 
conflict and encourages adherence 
to international humanitarian law; 
an important element in preventing 
violence towards noncombatants 
[1,24]. DWIs increase scrutiny and 
accountability specifically for dirty 
war methods. DWIs are analogous to 
corruption and bribery indices used 
by nongovernmental organizations 
and the World Bank to improve 
international governance through 
public monitoring and ranking 
governments by corruption [43,44]. In 
Better: A Surgeon’s Notes on Performance 
[45], Atul Gawande describes how 
systematic analysis of war casualties 
reveals problems and suggests 
solutions, and how identifying 
exemplary performers can improve 
general performance. The DWI is 
developed for systematic, data-driven 
identification of relatively good versus 
bad performance, heightening its 
potential to stimulate positive change.
Military and political leaders not 
only want to win wars. They also seek 
superior moral authority [23]. Moral 
authority has social currency, creating 
better access to material resources, 
support, and security within local and 
international communities. To improve 
behavior in combatants and politicians 
insufficiently motivated by altruism, 
harnessing such self-interest is crucial. 
Exposure of atrocities through DWIs 
can put reputation, legitimacy, future 
resources, threat of retaliation, or 
power itself at stake [24]. 
As comparative rates, DWIs evoke the 
potential for change. The possibility 
of becoming “cleaner” may appeal 
to some offenders [24]. Actors may 
compete for better outcomes relative to 
military opponents, relative to in-group 
political competitors, or relative to 
themselves over time. A DWI’s potency 
can be increased by engagement with 
social, cultural, and religious values of 
actors and their communities: honor 
versus dishonor [24], gaining versus 
losing “face,” shame versus pride, 
dignity versus humiliation [37,46], 
sacred versus profane [37], and valuing 
mercy and the lives of innocents [47]. 
Terms other than “Dirty War Index,” 
e.g., the “Dishonorable War Index,” 
could be used to greater effect in 
different contexts. 
War and its destruction trigger 
emotions and self-interests that can 
obscure analysis by threatening us so 
that we revert to familiar prejudices, 
reactions, and cognitive frameworks. 
Through a public health approach 
using valid, precise proportional rates 
as outcomes, DWIs can help us and 
our audiences to detach from political 
biases and break through psychological 
denial when considering actors or 
methods in war. DWIs can present 
conflict data from a new perspective, 
thereby encouraging actors in war 
to reassess their combat methods, 
accountability, and interests.  
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